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I. INTRODUCTION
Enforcement of international environmental policies on the high seas
has run a frustrating and sometimes elusive course. While nations are now
beginning to enforce environmental policies to protect the marine
environment, these policies carry no legal weight outside the implementing
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nation's own territorial sea.' As a result, many nations - in particular the
United States - have sought to effectuate international adherence to
domestic policies through the use of unilateral trade embargoes, thereby
infusing a "modem tendency to link trade with environmental issues."2
Modem international law favors environmental protection, however,
domestic environmental policies enforced through trade or trade
embargoes are curiously and ironically inconsistent with international law
pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).3 With
the modem preference to encourage free trade and a global economy,
GATT has become the conservationist's worst enemy as it continuously
trumps domestic attempts to initiate marine environmental protection.
This article examines the implementation of unilateral trade embargoes and
their subsequent nullification under GATT.
II. BACKGROUND: THE HIGH SEAS AND THE UNILATERAL
TRADE EMBARGO

Since time immemorial, the high seas have been regarded as the

common property of all mankind.4 As such, the high seas, with their vast
and rich marine resources, have been continuously exploited due to the
lack of international law restricting harvesting of their resources. Until the

post-World War II era, nations were still clinging to seventeenth-century
Grotian5 notions that ocean resources were inexhaustible.6 With increased
technology and an increased world population, however, nations quickly
came to realize the deficiency in their antiquated views; ocean resources
were becoming scarce and conservation was "necessary to prevent their
total depletion."7

1. See Taunya L. McLarty, WTO andNAFO Coalescence:A ParetoImprovementfor Both
Free Trade and Fish Conservation, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 469,469-70 (1996).
2. Id at 475.
3. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
4. See JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN HiSTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1982
TREATY AND ITS REJECnON BY THE UNITED STATES 2 (1992).

5. See Derrick M. Kedziora, Comment, GunboatDiplomacy in the Northwest Atlantic: The
1995 Canada-EUFishingDispute and the UnitedNations Agreement on Straddling and High
MigratoryFish Stocks, 17NW. JINT'LL. & Bus. 1132, 1134 & n.8 (1997) (citing MORELL, supra
note 4, at 2). Grotian notions are attributed to the works of seventeenth-century philosopher Hugo
Grotius, including his 1609 pamphlet entitled MareLiberum. See id (citing R.P. ANAND, ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 77-89 (1982)).
6. See Kedziora, supranote 5, at 1134-35.
7. Id at 1135 (citing JAMES C.F. WANG, HANDBOOK ON OCEAN POLMCS AND LAW 43-44
(1992)). See generally MORELL, supranote 4, at 27-74 (describing the evolution of the 12- and
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Attempts to protect the ever-dwindling marine resources were equally
frustrated by established international law. While nations are entitled to
a degree of sovereignty over their territorial sea, extending 12 to 200 miles
from their coast," the high seas, that is, the area beyond the 200-mile limit,
are "beyond the sovereignty of any state"9 and subject to unrestricted
exploitation. Therefore, even those nations who actually attempt to
conserve the ocean environment are left with few options for enforcement
outside their territorial jurisdiction.
Unilateral trade embargoes seem the most appropriate measure for
gaining extraterritorial enforcement power, but international law denies
their implementation and imposes only soft obligations to protect the
environment. For example, Principles 2 and 12 of the Rio Declaration, °
principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration," the preamble to the U.N.
Convention on Biological Diversity, 12 and the Panama Declaration 3
specifically denounce the use ofenvironmentally motivated trade measures
that have an economic effect. The Fish Stocks Agreement 4 and the Law

200-mile limits on offshore jurisdictional zones, which occurred from 1969-1979).
8. See United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, Third U.N. Conference on the Law
of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 2-3, 56-58, U.N. Doc.A/Conf.62/121, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
9. Patrick Shavloske, Comment, The Canadian-SpanishFishingDispute: A Template for
Assessing the Inadequaciesof the UnitedNations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea and a Clarion
Callfor Ratificationof the New FishStock Treaty, 7 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 223, 225 (1996)
(citing UNCLOS, supra note 8, arts. 87, 89).
10. Report ofthe UN. Conference on Environment and Development, The Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.I (1992), 31
I.L.M. 874, 876 (principle 2), 878 (principle 12) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
11. Report of the UN. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 & Corr. I
(.1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
12. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological
Diversity, opened for signature, Rio de Janeiro, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (1992)
[hereinafter Biological Diversity Convention].
13. Panama Declaration, signed Oct. 4, 1995 at Panama City, given effect by International
Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-42, 2(a)(1), I I Stat. 1122, 1122 (1997)
(codified as amended at scattered sections 16 U.S.C.); see Joshua R. Floum, DefendingDolphins
and Sea Turtles: On the FrontLines in an "Us-Them" Dialectic, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. REv. 943,
954 & n. 44 (1998); Deidre McGrath, Note, Writing Different Lyrics to the Same Old Tune: The
New (and Improved) 1997Amendments to the MarineMammalProtectionAct, 7 MINN. J.GLOBAL
TRADE 431, 442 & nn.72 & 73 (1998).
14. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 8, Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.164/37, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement].
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of the Seas Convention 5 impose only vague and qualified obligations upon
nations to take active conservational steps.
While the use of trade measures effectively entices, encourages, or
coerces other nations to adopt conservational policies, they clearly have an
adverse effect on international trade. As a result, these measures are
inconsistent with GATT, and unless an implementing nation can show that
its embargo satisfies a GATT exception, these measures will be found in
violation of international law.'

III.

THE ENVIRONMENT: ECONOMIC BYCATCH UNDER THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

A. Article III: National Treatment Provision
Nearly all unilateral trade embargoes imposed to protect the marine
environment will be asserted by the implementing nation as being
consistent with GATT Article III," the National Treatment provision.
Article III requires that GATT parties treat imported products like domestic
products.' 8 In the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 9 the panel concluded that Article III is an
inapplicable means by which to justify an environmental embargo for the
simple fact that "Article III calls for a comparison between the treatment
accorded to domestic and imported like products,not for a comparison of
the [harvesting] policies and practices of the country of origin."20 In nearly
all instances, environmental protection measures imposed through a trade
embargo attempt to force other nations to adopt more conservative
harvesting approaches. Since, in general, oceanic resources are harvested
with the use of nets, a nation imposing environmental protection measures
will almost always be imposing its embargo to alter (1) the type of nets
being used by the target nation, or (2) the harvesting policies of that nation.
Article III therefore, does not apply to unilateral trade embargoes because
they explicitly attack the harvesting practices and policies of the importing
nation in contravention to GATT.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Tuna, 33
20.

UNCLOS, supra note 8.
See McLarty, supra note 1, at 476.
See GATT 1947, supranote 3, art. III, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 14-15.
See id.art. 111(2), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 14.
GAT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of
I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna I1].
Id. para. 5.7, at 889.
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B. Article X: Antitrade Embargo Provision
Article XI of GATT is the crux of the GATT exceptions. Embargoes
that prohibit the importation of a good are always deemed in violation of
Article XI because they enforce "quantitative restrictions, including import
quotas,"'' upon the importation of a particular product. Therefore, nearly
every unilateral trade embargo will fall within the reach of Article Xl's
language because it would effectively restrict importation quantity, which
is in violation of GATT.
C. Article X
Where a nation is in violation of Article XI, it has the opportunity to
effectively "save" its embargo by asserting a general exception under
Article XX.22 Article XX provides an extensive list of exceptions to the
otherwise GATT-violative or trade-restrictive acts of a nation. Only two
apply in oceanic environmental cases: the Article XX(b) animal health
exception and the Article XX(g) exhaustible natural resources exception.23
1. Preamble
None of the Article XX exceptions can be imposed by the
24
implementing nation unless it can satisfy the preamble, or "chapeau,)
requirements of Article XX. In order to pass muster under the preamble,
the implementing nation must show that its embargo is not (1) an arbitrary
25
or unjustifiable restriction, or (2) a disguised restriction on trade.
a. Arbitraryor Unjustifiable Restriction
The problem that environmentally motivated trade embargoes impose
is that if an implementing nation is to have any international or
extraterritorial effect, it must focus the embargo on noncomplying nations
rather than on the particular goods involved. GATT, however, clearly
denounces the use of trade measures that focus on a "nation" as opposed

21. GATT 1947, supra note 3, art. XI(I), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 28-29.
22. Id. art. XX, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 56-59. Once Article XX is invoked by an implementing

nation, the burden shifts to that nation to show that the Article XX exceptions do apply. See Canada
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GAIT B.I.S.D. (30th
Supp.) para. 5.20, at 140, 164.
23. See GATT 1947, supra note 3, art. XX(I)(b), (I)(g), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 57.
24. Chapeau is French for "hat," DENIS GERARD, CASSELL'S FRENCH-ENGLISH ENGLISHFRENCH DICTIONARY 144 (1981), and refers to the top portion of the Article XX language.
25. See GATT 1947, supra note 3, art. XX, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 56-57.

-
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to a "class of products. 26
For example, in the Tuna-Dolphin decisions,' if the United States
had constructed its embargo to deny importation of all tuna caught using
purse-seine nets, this clearly would have satisfied the burden of the

arbitrary and unjustifiable restriction prong of the Article XX preamble
because the embargo would have targeted all fish not caught with
"environmentally-conservative" nets. Instead, the United States, like many
other nations seeking to impose environmental policies on the high seas,
focused its embargo on the nations that did not conform to U.S. domestic

standards for reducing dolphin bycatch in the harvesting of tuna.2'
The reason for the nation-specific embargo rationale is simple. If a
nation is to effectively eliminate the importation of marine products
harvested in contravention to its conservationist policies, it must focus on

all such products that enter its territory from an offending nation. Clearly,
with products such as shrimp, tuna, and other readily available oceanic
resources being imported from hundreds ofnations, it is almost impossible
for a nation to discriminate between those products that were caught
conservatively and those products that were not.
In addition, embargoes must be nation-specific because many
exporting nations will try to circumvent an embargo constructed to deny
importation of products harvested using conservationally unsound methods
by first exporting its goods to an intermediary and complying nation so as
to disguise their true origin.2 9
Consequently, nations enforcing
environmental harvesting practices are forced to tailor their embargoes to
focus on the national origin of the product, and clearly cannot avoid having
such an intermediary effect.3"
In holding with the narrow construction of the GATT articles, GATT
panels will almost exclusively find in accordance with their past holdings
and determine that such embargoes are arbitrary and unjustifiable, despite
the embargo enforcing nation's good faith imposition of the embargo as a
conservational measure.

26. See United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, May 26, GATTr
B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) paras. 54-55, at 107 (1983); see also United States-Prohibition of Imports
of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, Feb. 22, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.), at 91 (1982).
27. GAIT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna 11,33 I.L.M.
Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna 1];
at 889.
28. See The Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1994) [hereinafter

MMPA].
29. See McLarty, supra note 1, at 474-75.
30. See id.
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b. DisguisedRestriction on Trade
Nations are thwarted in their attempts to protect the environment by
the "disguised restriction on international trade" prong of the Article XX
preamble.3 In order to satisfy the requirement, the implementing nation
must have adopted a trade restriction that offers no greater protection to its
own domestic products than it does to imported products. a2
In practice, compliance with this requirement is difficult for a nation
to prove because GATT panels are composed of international trade
theorists whose sole purpose of empanelment is to ensure free trade.
GATT panels have imposed tremendous scrutiny on the potential
protectionist effects of such embargoes. If trade is hampered by an
embargo and domestic products reap the rewards of limited competition,
GATT panels clearly will rule the embargo a disguised restriction on trade,
thereby precluding imposition of any exception under Article XX.
2. Exceptions
Even if a nation can traverse the minefield of Article XX's preamble,
it is usually confronted with an equally difficult burden of proving that the
exceptions actually justify its unilateral trade embargo.
a. RestrictionsDesignedto ProtectAnimal Life
Article XX(b) allows a nation to impose a unilateral trade restriction
if it is necessary for the protection of animal health.33 The exception
hinges on the "necessary" language, requiring that "there was no
alternative measure reasonably available"34 to the implementing nation by
which to achieve its desired conservation objective before imposing a
unilateral trade embargo. As a result, the Article XX(b) exception refers
not to the particular animal or plant to be protected, but to the actual "trade
restriction chosen by the party."35
Theoretically, a nation must have exhausted every possible alternative
means of ensuring compliance with its domestic conservationist policies
before it can impose a unilateral trade embargo. GATT Dispute Panels
have consistently found any attempts to impose an Article XX(b) exception
where a nation has failed to negotiate multilateral cooperative

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

GAIT 1947, supra note 3, art. XX, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 57.
See id. arts. XI, XX(IXg), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 14, 57, respectively.
See id art. XX(I)(b), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 57.
Tuna I, para. 5.24, 30 I.L.M. at 1619.
McLarty, supranote 1, at 482.
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agreements,36 seek private causes of action,37 or further pursue diplomatic
negotiation to be inconsistent with the "necessary" requirement.38 Most
striking is the fact that GATT panels do not inquire as to the possible
' GATT panels
success of any of the proffered "alternative measure[s]." 39
seem to require that these alternative means be undertaken, even if they are
known to have no effect and their implementation would be fruitless in
achieving the desired conservation result.
In Tuna I, for example, the court found that the United States had not
fully exhausted negotiation attempts with Mexico before imposing its
embargo,' even though Mexico had refused to negotiate any settlement
after four years of requests by the U.S. government.4 Even though it was
clear that Mexico had no interest in reaching a negotiated solution with the
United States, the GATT panel found that alternative means under Article
XX(b) had not been fully exhausted.42
Similarly, in pursuing their objective of ensuring continued free trade
among contracting nations, GATT panels continually sway towards an
interpretation of GATT that permits them to denounce trade restrictive
measures. In Tuna I, the panel concluded that Article XX(b) could not be
applied extraterritorially, 43 even though the "language of Article XX does
not explicitly or implicitly contain this territorial element." In Tuna II,
GATT switched gears, offering that nations could conceivably take
unilateral "trade measures to implement policies within their own
jurisdiction, including policies to protect living things,"4' but found the
embargo to be inconsistent with GATT for different reasons.46
With no precedential authority, GATT can be interpreted in any
manner that strikes a particular panel's fancy. In effect, GATT can be
shaped and reshaped to find any unilateral trade embargo inconsistent with
Article XX(b) if the panel so desires. In addition, with the imposition of
the exception focused on the implementing nation's means of imposing the
embargo (least restrictive alternative) and not on the nation's motive

36. See Tuna I, para. 5.28, 30 I.L.M. at 1620.
37. See McLarty, supra note 1, at 486.
38. See id.
39. Tuna I, para.5.28, 30 I.L.M. at 1620.
40. See id
41. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Using Trade to Enforce InternationalEnvironmental Law:
Implicationsfor United States Law, I.IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 273, 289 (1994).
42. See id. paras. 5.26-.29, at 1620.

43.
44.
45.
46.

See id.
para.5.29, at 1620.
McLarty, supra note 1, at 483.
Tuna 11, para 5.38, 33 l.L.M. at 897.
See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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(conservation of a living thing), the exception itself is illusory.
b. RestrictionsDesignedto Conserve an Exhaustible
NaturalResource
Article XX(g) provides that an embargo that fails under Article XI
can be upheld if it has been imposed in order to preserve an exhaustible
natural resource.47 In Tuna I, the panel denoted a two-part test by which
to determine whether a restriction satisfies this exception.4 First, the
restriction must be "related to" or "primarily aimed at" conservation,49 and
secondly, the restriction must fall within an accepted range of conservation
policies.5°
To satisfy the first prong, a nation must show that its imposition of
a unilateral trade embargo is primarily aimed at protecting an exhaustible
natural resource. In particular, it must show that the desired effect of the
embargo is to encourage other nations to adopt conservation measures to
protect a certain resource, rather than to encourage a particular type of
conservationmeasure.
In a recent GATT panel decision, UnitedStates- Import Prohibition
of CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products," the panel found that the U.S.
embargo was not in accordance with the "primarily aimed at" prong of
Article XX(g) because it imposed an obligation upon other nations to use
a certain type of net that bears a turtle excluder device (TED).52 Although
use of the TED is an environmentally sound means of shrimping that
decreases bycatch of sea turtles, the GATT panel held that other means
existed by which to conserve the sea turtle without implementing TEDs.53
In effect, the panel held that the U.S. embargo legislation was primarily
aimed at enforcing the use of TEDs-upon offending nations and not at the
conservation of the sea turtle.54 Therefore, invocation of Article XX(g)
was precluded as an applicable exception to defend the U.S. embargo.
47. See GATT 1947, art. XX (I)(g), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 57.
48. See Tuna I, paras. 5.30-5.34, 30 I.L.M. at 1620-21.
49. Id. para. 5.31, at 1620-21; see GATT 1947, art. XX(I)(g), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 57.
50. See Tuna I, para. 5.32, 30 I.L.M. at 1621.
5 1. United States - Import Prohibitionof CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products, May 15,
1998, WT/DS58/R/Corr.2, available at 1998 WL 256632, at * I (W.T.O.) [hereinafter Sea Turtle
Case].
52. Id. at *51-*52.
53. Though the panel did not specify the alternative means available, clearly the panel
recognized that TED nets are not the only way to prevent sea turtle bycatch. See id. at *50-*52.
In particular, shrimpers cannot shrimp where sea turtles are known to congregate, or they can drop
their nets deeper where sea turtles are less likely to be found.
54. See id. at *51-*52.
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Even the second prong of the Article XX(g) test poses serious
obstacles for an implementing nation. In order to comply, a nation must
show that it "implemented trade measures... inconjunction with domestic
conservation legislation"" and that these domestic measures fall "within
' Where
the range of policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources."56
a nation has acted on domestic conservation legislation, the burden to show
that it is in compliance with acceptable conservation methodologies is
quite difficult, especially in light of the fact that four major bodies of law
actively discourage unilateral trade measures: the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 7 the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity," the Rio
Declaration,59 and the Stockholm Declaration. 60
In addition, it will be difficult for a nation to show that the
conservation objectives can successfully be imposed on the offending
nation. In most instances, the nations targeted by a unilateral trade
embargo are developing nations. 6' The typical scenario would involve a
developed and diversified nation imposing its trade embargo on a less
modernized, developing nation, which is afforded a great degree of latitude
pursuant to international environmental policies.62 Therefore, despite the
most narrowly focused and disinterested intentions of a nation in
attempting to enforce its domestic policies through the Article XX(g)
exception, nearly all attempts to regulate the high seas will fail.
IV. GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANELS

Nations who choose to take steps to protect the environment are
clearly left with no effective alternative but to resort to unilateral trade
measures for enforcement of their policies. The problem is that GATT
becomes the arbitrator of environmental policies through the interpretation
of trade laws rather than environmental law and policy. While GATT does
55. McLarty, supra note 1, at 493.
56. GATT 1947, art. XX(IXg), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 57.
57. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, pmbl., at 1271.
58. See Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 12, pmbl., at 823.
59. See Rio Declaration, supra note 10, princ. 2, at 876.
60. See Stockholm Declaration, supranote 11, princ. 21, at 1420.
61. In Tuna I, the United States targeted the nations of Mexico, Venezuela, Vanatu, and
Panama, of which only Mexico can be considered developed. See Tuna!, 30 I.L.M. at 1599-1600.
Equally, the Sea Turtle Case focused its embargo on Malaysia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan, all
of which are considered developing nations pursuant to international doctrine. See Sea Turtle Case,
para. 3.97, 1998 WL 256632, at *51.
62. See Rio Declaration, supra note 10, princs. 11, 12, at 878; Biological Diversity
Convention, supra note 12, art. 3, at 824; UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 61, para. 3, at 1281;
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 11, princ. 21, at 1420.
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provide environmental exceptions to allow the use of unilateral trade
action, in nearly every instance, in seeking to ensure the continuation of
free trade, GATT panels will construe GATT narrowly and find against the
environment. This tendency is more than evident in two recent dispute
panel decisions rendered against the United States and has clearly set the
trend where world trade trumps the environment under GATT.
A. UnitedStates v. Mexico: Tuna-DolphinI
In 1991, the first battle between "the economy" and "the
environment" was waged when the government of Mexico presented a case
to GATT involving United States restrictions on imports of tuna.63 The
dispute was rooted in U.S. domestic legislation that was aimed at
preventing the bycatch of certain dolphin in the Eastern tropical Pacific
Ocean by imposing an embargo" against all nations engaging in the

harvesting of yellow-fin tuna with purse-seine nets.65 Despite the fact that
the embargo was vague in providing that the incidental catch of dolphins
be "comparable to the average rate of incidental taking by United States
vessels," the GATT panel found the embargo in violation of international
law for various GATT-related reasons.
1. Article XX(b) Exception

The panel found that because the imposition of the embargo hinged
on the concurrent taking rates of dolphin bycatch by U.S. fishing vessels,
the policies were so vague that "the Mexican authorities could not know
whether, at a given point of time, their policies conformed to the United
' As such, the imposition of the
States' dolphin protection standards."67
embargo could not be based on any factual analysis that would bring it
under the meaning of "necessary" in Article XX(b).
2. Article XX(g) Exception
The panel limited the Article XX(g) exception to controlling the
"production or consumption of an exhaustible natural resource.., to the
extent that the production or consumption is under [that nation's territorial]

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Tuna!, 30 I.L.M. at 1594.
See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B).
See Tuna 1, 30 I.L.M. at 1598.
MMPA, 16 U.S.C § 1371(aX2)(B)(ii).
Tuna I, par 5.28, 30 I.L.M. at 1620.
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'
jurisdiction."68
In addition, the panel referred to the vagueness of the
standards by which the embargo became enforceable and noted that such
"unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as being primarily aimed
at the conservation of dolphins" 9 when they did not distinguish between
dolphins caught with purse-seine nets and those that were not.

B. United States v. EuropeanEconomic Community: Tuna-DolphinII
In a GATT dispute panel resolution concerning the same U.S.
domestic legislation imposed in Tuna I, the United States was equally
defeated by the European Economic Community and the Netherlands in
1994.70
1. Article XX(b) Exception
The panel, in reiterating its Tuna I observations that vague embargo
standards cannot be deemed necessary within the meaning of the
exception, 7' also found that Article XX(b) failed due to its extraterritorial
effects.' In particular, the panel noted that the primary and intermediary
nation embargoes "could achieve [their] desired effect only if... followed
by changes in policies and practices in the exporting countries." ' The
effect of the United States embargo, however, was to "force other countries
to change their policies... within their own jurisdiction" and therefore it
had no "effect on the protection of the life or health of dolphins."' 4
2. Article XX(g) and (d) Exceptions
Article XX(g) was not asserted by the United States in Tuna II, as it
had been conclusively denounced as an applicable exception in Tuna L
The United States, however, did attempt to assert the exception under
Article XX(d)7 5 of GATT, which allows a nation to impose measures
"necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of [the GATT] agreement."'7
In furtherance of this article's conclusion that GATT panel decisions

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. para. 5.31, at 1620-21.
Id para. 5.34, at 1621.
See Tuna II, 33 I.L.M. at 839.
See Tuna I, para. 5.28, 30 I.L.M. at 1620.

72. See id., para. 5.29, 30 I.L.M. at 1620.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Tuna II, para 5.37, 33 I.L.M. at 897.
Id
See GATr 1947, supranote 3, art XX(I)(d), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 57.
Id
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are predetermined and presuppose defeat of environmental trade measures,
it is interesting to note that the panel declined to examine the Article
XX(d) exception." Curiously, the panel emasculated the Article XX(d)
exception by stating that if the trade restrictions imposed by a nation were
inconsistent with the GATT pursuant to Article XI, then they were
inconsistent with GATT as a whole, thereby precluding an Article XX(d)
invocation. 8 In effect, the panel announced that the Article XX(d)
exception is a toothless exception to GATT's general exceptions under
Article XX because it can never be invoked. Obviously, the drafters of
GATT did not include an exception that they knew could never be
invoked, yet the panel saw fit to impose this narrow and ridiculous
interpretation in order to defeat the Article XX(d) assertion by the United
States.
V. CONCLUSION

Attempts by the United States to protect dolphin in the Eastern
tropical Pacific Ocean were consistently defeated by GATT dispute panels
on the basis of their side-effect on international trade. In addition, U.S.
attempts to protect the deep sea turtle from harmful shrimping practices
were defeated by GATT trade panels. As a result, GATT has become a
tremendous obstacle to the imposition of any environmental conservation
objectives and has effectively discouraged nations from engaging in such
policies for fear of hampering international trade.
To the chagrin of conservationists, international environmental law
has come to be governed by international trade law. As Michael J. Kelly
espoused in his analysis of the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord,
"[I]nternational trade regimes have been institutionalized and have grown
strong over the past century. Conversely, international environmental law
reflects only a patchwork of treaties and customs between states."" Until
nations decide to take effective and binding action for the enforcement of
globally-agreed upon conservation goals, protection of the environment
will continue to be obstructed by the well-established rules of international
trade. When the world finally decides to put the environment first,
however, it may be too late to save the marine resources of the high seas.

77. See Tuna II, paras. 5.7, 5.40-5.41, 33 I.L.M. at 889, 898, respectively.
78. See id
79. Michael J. Kelly, Bringing a Complaint Under the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord:
Difficult Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger, But Movement in the Right Direction, 24 PEP'.
L.REv. 71,96(1996) (citing Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary
Issues and the Emergence ofa New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 707-08 (1993)).
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